We're always amused by what goes on at the HH website, but especially so when it involves the endless mental masturbation about the Mercedes, specifically where it was supposedly heading and where it ultimately sank after exploding. Not surprisingly, much of this is being pursued by our libelous little buddy, Doc.
The HH poseurs appear to lack a basic, common sense understanding of the inherent limitations of historical analysis. That, despite first-hand accounts (which are nearly always flawed), maps, ship and nautical notes, secondary sources, etc., one cannot re-create precisely, with 100 percent certainty, what has happened in the past. Every student who's had even an elementary course in history is taught this truism.
Gazing back into the mists of history requires humility, something the HH clowns are in short supply of (this is what happens when you surround yourselves with yes men while killing all contrary opinion in your midst). Attempts to recreate, or analyze, historic events must be approached with the understanding that one can't possibly conclude what happened with certainty, or what the players involved actually thought or did. Nor can one overlook or diminish the role of human unpredictability that influences events, which ultimately end up as mere snapshots in time. We can certainly do our best to try to understand what happened and why, but we can never claim to have captured every nuance or explain away every mystery, especially concerning events that occurred over 200 years ago.
But all these practical considerations don't stop our little worker bee Doc from stating with near certainly where he thinks the Mercedes was headed and went down (this despite less-than-subtle suggestions from Solomon to cool it given the limitations of the historical evidence). Not does it prevent him from using words like "certainly," "definitively," "we can conclude," etc. and other modifiers that would indicate he's positively figured out precisely what happened between two nations and several ships on a single day in 1804.
Why this effort? Perhaps Doc requires a mental distraction from the harsh, real-world reality of his upcoming Odyssey libel trial. We're left to merely speculate.
This is one of the most damning behaviors of the HH poseurs: They believe their amateur interpretation of online research and assorted secondary sources, coupled with their own (often wild) speculations, results in a magical reaction that results in -- POOF -- the truth.
Of course, we all know it's slightly more complicated than that....
7 comments:
We know they were coming from South America and, from Graham Moors letter, were heading for Cadiz. Now how would you get there in the age of sail when navigation was still a complex art? Perhaps you would head north to the latitude of Cape St Mary and head east, keeping just to the south of the cape. This way you get a land fix without finding it the hard way by running aground, then head South East to Cadiz. Ever think about just how the Brits know just where to find them?
A Nobody
Doc seems to think that they headed North West (the 310 heading) for a Portuguese port. Now why would they do that? The Portuguese hated the Spanish, Google “War of the Oranges” for the Portuguese Spanish history of the years 1801 to 1804.
A Nobody
Last, I think the Spanish have know just about where the wreck is since the recovery or right after. How do they know this? Well the Spanish have had illegal immigration, smuggling, and terrorist problems for a long time, do you think that the Spanish would not be doing maritime air patrols every day or so out that way? The Spanish would also have made a real big noise if they thought the wreck was near territorial waters as it is an easy win for them.
A Nobody
I think Graham Moore knew where he was when he spotted the Spanish ships, and it was 9 leagues SW of the Cape. The Spanish ships were spotted even further SW, so we're talking at least 30 miles from the Cape. Here's a copy of his letter to Cornwallis dated Oct. 6th.
"Sir, I have the honour to acquaint you that I have executed the service you did me the honour to charge me with.
On the morning of the 29th of September, the Indefatigable got off Cadiz; on the 30th we fell in with the Medusa. Captain Gore having informed me the Amphion was in the Strait's mouth, and that the Triumph was off Gibraltar, and that Sir Robert Barlow meant to go into Cadiz for the trade there, on his way to England, I thought to send the Medusa to apprise Sir Robert Barlow of the nature of my order, that he might then judge whether or not he should go into Cadiz, and I directed Captain Gore to rejoin me with the Amphion as soon as possible off Cape St. Mary. On the 2nd inst. I was joined by the Lively, and on the third by the Medusa and Amphion; the latter having communicated what I thought necessary to Sir Robert Barlow.
Yesterday morning, Cape St. Mary bearing N. E. nine leagues, the Medusa made the signal for four sail W. by S.; I made the signal for a general chase; at eight A.M. discovered them to be four large Spanish frigates, which formed the line of battle ahead on our approach roach, and continued to steer in for Cadiz, the van ship carrying a broad pennant, and the ship next to her a rear-admiral's flag. Captain Gore's being the headmost ship, placed the Medusa on the weather-beam of the commodore; the Indefatigable took a similar position alongside of the rear-admiral; the Amphion and Lively each taking an opponent in the same manner, as they came up. After hailing to make them shorten sail without effect, I fired a shot across the rear-admiral's fore-foot, on which he shortened sail, and I sent Lieutenant Ascott, of the Indefatigable, to inform him that my orders were to detain his squadron; that it was my earnest wish to execute them without bloodshed, but that his determination must be made instantly. After waiting some time, I made the signal for the boat, and fired a shot ahead of the admiral. As soon as the officer returned, with an unsatisfactory answer, I fired another shot ahead of the admiral, and bore down close on his weather bow. At this moment the admiral's second astern fired into the Amphion; the admiral fired into the Indefatigable; and I made the signal for close battle, which was instantly commenced with all the alacrity and vigour of English sailors. In less than ten minutes, la Mercedes, the admiral's second astern, blew up alongside the Amphion, with a tremendous explosion. Captain Sutton having, with great judgment and much to my satisfaction, placed himself to leeward of that ship, the escape of the Spanish admiral's ship was rendered impossible. In less than half an hour she struck, as did the opponent of the Lively. Perceiving at this moment the Spanish commodore was making off and seeming to have the heels of the Medusa, I made the signal for the Lively to join in the chase, having before noticed the superior sailing of that ship. Captain Hamond did not lose an instant, and we had the satisfaction, long before sunset, to see from our masthead that the only remaining ship had surrendered to the Medusa and Lively."
How far could Graham Moore see at Sea? The ships lookouts were stationed in the masts on the trestle or cross trees which were above the tops. What were the height of the trees? The USS Constitution has a main mast 220' high from step to truck. This means that from the keel to the very top it is 220' high. Now the Brit Frigates were a bit smaller so let's use 200.' Now subtract 20 feet for the depth of hull and about 25 feet for the distance between the trees and the truck and get a height of 155'. Let's use 150' for this analysis. The distance you can see from 150' above the water is 16.5 miles, so from the trees a lookout can see 16.5 miles to Port and 16.5 miles to Starboard or an expanse of ocean of 33 miles.
Now how did Moor know where Cape St Mary was? Did he need to see it? No, all he needed was to know where it was and just about where he was, after all I don't need to see Chicago from New York to know how far and on what baring it is. Another alternative is that he got a bearing from an inshore ship and extrapolated his bearing from that. See below.
Now Moore had 4 ships and under perfect conditions these 4 ships could spread out in line abreast and sweep over 132 miles of ocean. Each ship being stationed 33 miles from the next. But conditions are never perfect, so let's cut this way back and station each ship 5 miles from the next which would put them into good signal range and allow them to concentrate quickly. Using 5 miles he would have had his inshore ship 5 miles south of Cape St Mary and his offshore ship 20 miles off sweeping a total of 25 miles of sea.
But who am I
A Nobody
Hey Nobody, a further refinement of your analysis. The distance you calculate is to the horizon. Another ship of the same size could be sighted beyond the horizon at about twice the distance (an upper sail or portion of the main mast).
That is where the 33 miles between ships under ideal conditions comes from. You don't need to see the ship, just the lookout 150 feet up its mast. But this is more of a seach line or maybe a patrol line is the correct word and the ships would need to be able to gather into a battle line or group when they found the Spanish. So they would be much closer together. I would also think that being able to read flag signals - no radio then - would require a closer spacing. So I picked 5 miles.
But I am just
A nobody
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